The Evolution of Cooperation in the Unidirectional Division of Labour on a Tree Network

Division of labour on complex networks is rarely investigated using evolutionary game theory. We investigate a division of labour where divided roles are assigned to groups on the nodes of a general unidirectional finite tree graph network. From the network's original node, a task flows and is divided along the branches. A player is randomly selected in each group of cooperators and defectors, who receives a benefit from a cooperator in the upstream group and a part of the task. A cooperator completes their part by paying a cost and then passing it downstream until the entire task is completed. Defectors do not do anything and the division of labour stops, causing all groups to suffer losses due to the incomplete task. We develop a novel method to analyse the local stability in this general tree. We discover that not the benefits but the costs of the cooperation influence the evolution of cooperation, and defections in groups that are directly related to that group's task cause damage to players in that group. We introduce two sanction systems, one of which induces the evolution of cooperation more than the system without sanctions, and promote the coexistence of cooperator and defector groups.