Experiential Values Are Underweighted in Decisions Involving Symbolic Options

Overview

Journal Nat Hum Behav

Specialties Psychology
Social Sciences

Date 2023 Jan 5

PMID 36604497

Authors

Basile Garcia

Mael Lebreton

Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde

Stefano Palminteri

Affiliations

Soon will be listed here.

Abstract

Standard models of decision-making assume each option is associated with subjective value, regardless of whether this value is inferred from experience (experiential) or explicitly instructed probabilistic outcomes (symbolic). In this study, we present results that challenge the assumption of unified representation of experiential and symbolic value. Across nine experiments, we presented participants with hybrid decisions between experiential and symbolic options. Participants' choices exhibited a pattern consistent with a systematic neglect of the experiential values. This normatively irrational decision strategy held after accounting for alternative explanations, and persisted even when it bore an economic cost. Overall, our results demonstrate that experiential and symbolic values are not symmetrically considered in hybrid decisions, suggesting they recruit different representational systems that may be assigned different priority levels in the decision process. These findings challenge the dominant models commonly used in value-based decision-making research.

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