The Description-experience Gap: a Challenge for the Neuroeconomics of Decision-making Under Uncertainty

The experimental investigation of decision-making in humans relies on two distinct types of paradigms, involving either description- or experience-based choices. In description-based paradigms, decision variables (i.e. payoffs and probabilities) are explicitly communicated by means of symbols. In experience-based paradigms decision variables are learnt from trial-by-trial feedback. In the decision-making literature, 'description-experience gap' refers to the fact that different biases are observed in the two experimental paradigms. Remarkably, well-documented biases of description-based choices, such as under-weighting of rare events and loss aversion, do not apply to experience-based decisions. Here, we argue that the description-experience gap represents a major challenge, not only to current decision theories, but also to the neuroeconomics research framework, which relies heavily on the translation of neurophysiological findings between human and non-human primate research. In fact, most non-human primate neurophysiological research relies on behavioural designs that share features of both description- and experience-based choices. As a consequence, it is unclear whether the neural mechanisms built from non-human primate electrophysiology should be linked to description-based or experience-based decision-making processes. The picture is further complicated by additional methodological gaps between human and non-human primate neuroscience research. After analysing these methodological challenges, we conclude proposing new lines of research to address them. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.