Selection in Health Insurance Markets and Its Policy Remedies

Overview

Journal J Econ Perspect

Date 2018 Feb 22

PMID 29465215

Citations 21

Authors

Michael Geruso

Timothy J Layton

Affiliations

Soon will be listed here.

Citing Articles

Adverse selection and network design under regulated plan prices: Evidence from Medicaid.

Kreider A, Layton T, Shepard M, Wallace J J Health Econ. 2024; 97:102901.

PMID: 38944945 PMC: 11392643. DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102901.

Scope and Incentives for Risk Selection in Health Insurance Markets With Regulated Competition: A Conceptual Framework and International Comparison.

van Kleef R, Reuser M, McGuire T, Armstrong J, Beck K, Brammli-Greenberg S Med Care Res Rev. 2024; 81(3):175-194.

PMID: 38284550 PMC: 11092299. DOI: 10.1177/10775587231222584.

Heterogeneity within the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment: An application of causal forests.

Hattab Z, Doherty E, Ryan A, ONeill S PLoS One. 2024; 19(1):e0297205.

PMID: 38236917 PMC: 10796043. DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0297205.

Risk adjustment for regional healthcare funding allocations with ensemble methods: an empirical study and interpretation.

Holster T, Ji S, Marttinen P Eur J Health Econ. 2024; 25(7):1117-1131.

PMID: 38170332 PMC: 11377675. DOI: 10.1007/s10198-023-01656-w.

What Difference Does a Health Plan Make? Evidence from Random Plan Assignment in Medicaid.

Geruso M, Layton T, Wallace J Am Econ J Appl Econ. 2023; 15(3):341-379.

PMID: 37621701 PMC: 10445793. DOI: 10.1257/app.20210843.

References

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