The Effect of Electrical Muscle Stimulation on Intentional Binding and Explicit Sense of Agency

Overview

Journal PeerJ

Specialties Biology
Environmental Health
General Medicine

Date 2024 Sep 23

PMID 39308820

Authors

Miwa Nagai

Kazuhiro Matsui

Keita Atsuumi

Kazuhiro Taniguchi

Hiroaki Hirai

Atsushi Nishikawa

Affiliations

Soon will be listed here.

Abstract

The motivating question for this study is determining whether electrical muscle stimulation (EMS)-induced movements can extend the user's ability without reducing the sense of agency. Moreover, it is crucial to find the timing of the EMS application that is robust against individual differences and environmental changes. Previous studies have reported that the user-specific EMS-application timings, determined through explicit measures of sense of agency, would effectively shorten their reaction time in a push task while maintaining their sense of agency. However, no study has investigated EMS-application timings in relation to implicit measures of sense of agency. Intentional binding, an example of an implicit measure, refers to the phenomenon whereby the interval between an intentional action and the subsequent perceptual outcome is typically perceived to be shorter than the actual interval. By measuring this perceptual shift using a Libet clock, we have identified an EMS-application timing that accelerates the users' push action while maintaining their sense of agency. First, to conduct the EMS-application experiment while appropriately maintaining the intentional binding effect, we designed a new push task such that a pre-action, as the base timing of the EMS-application trigger, always occurs just before the push movement. (1) We showed the difference between the action-binding effect of EMS-induced involuntary movements and voluntary push movements. Subsequently, (2) we identified the EMS application timing that significantly shifted judgments of action tasks while accelerating voluntary movements. Additionally, (3) we demonstrated that the EMS application could accelerate user pushing movement while maintaining the sense of agency at this specific application time. The proposed EMS in the novel pushing setup was found to be robustly effective against individual and environmental changes.

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