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Predicting the Subjective Intensity of Imagined Experiences from Electrophysiological Measures of Oscillatory Brain Activity

Overview
Journal Sci Rep
Specialty Science
Date 2024 Jan 8
PMID 38191506
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Abstract

Most people can conjure images and sounds that they experience in their minds. There are, however, marked individual differences. Some people report that they cannot generate imagined sensory experiences at all (aphantasics) and others report that they have unusually intense imagined experiences (hyper-phantasics). These individual differences have been linked to activity in sensory brain regions, driven by feedback. We would therefore expect imagined experiences to be associated with specific frequencies of oscillatory brain activity, as these can be a hallmark of neural interactions within and across regions of the brain. Replicating a number of other studies, relative to a Resting-State we find that the act of engaging in auditory or in visual imagery is linked to reductions in the power of oscillatory brain activity across a broad range of frequencies, with prominent peaks in the alpha band (8-12 Hz). This oscillatory activity, however, did not predict individual differences in the subjective intensity of imagined experiences. For audio imagery, these were rather predicted by reductions within the theta (6-9 Hz) and gamma (33-38 Hz) bands, and by increases in beta (15-17 Hz) band activity. For visual imagery these were predicted by reductions in lower (14-16 Hz) and upper (29-32 Hz) beta band activity, and by an increase in mid-beta band (24-26 Hz) activity. Our data suggest that there is sufficient ground truth in the subjective reports people use to describe the intensity of their imagined sensory experiences to allow these to be linked to the power of distinct rhythms of brain activity. In future, we hope to combine this approach with better measures of the subjective intensity of imagined sensory experiences to provide a clearer picture of individual differences in the subjective intensity of imagined experiences, and of why these eventuate.

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