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Co-Evolution of Complex Network Public Goods Game Under the Edges Rules

Overview
Journal Entropy (Basel)
Publisher MDPI
Date 2020 Dec 8
PMID 33285973
Citations 1
Authors
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Abstract

The reconnection of broken edges is an effective way to avoid drawback for the commons in past studies. Inspired by this, we proposed a public goods game model under the edges rules, where we evaluate the weight of edges by their nodes' payoff. The results proved that the game obtains a larger range of cooperation with a small gain factor by this proposed model by consulting Monte Carlo simulations (MCS) and real experiments. Furthermore, as the following the course of game and discussing the reason of cooperation, in the research, we found that the distribution entropy of the excess average degree is able to embody and predict the presence of cooperation.

Citing Articles

Trust-based partner switching among partitioned regions promotes cooperation in public goods game.

Kang H, Wang M, Shen Y, Sun X, Chen Q PLoS One. 2021; 16(6):e0253527.

PMID: 34181692 PMC: 8238186. DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0253527.

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