» Articles » PMID: 33004877

Deviations of Rational Choice: an Integrative Explanation of the Endowment and Several Context Effects

Overview
Journal Sci Rep
Specialty Science
Date 2020 Oct 2
PMID 33004877
Citations 3
Authors
Affiliations
Soon will be listed here.
Abstract

People's choices are often found to be inconsistent with the assumptions of rational choice theory. Over time, several probabilistic models have been proposed that account for such deviations from rationality. However, these models have become increasingly complex and are often limited to particular choice phenomena. Here we introduce a network approach that explains a broad set of choice phenomena. We demonstrate that this approach can be used to compare different choice theories and integrates several choice mechanisms from established models. A basic setup implements bounded rationality, loss aversion, and inhibition in a natural fashion, which allows us to predict the occurrence of well-known choice phenomena, such as the endowment effect and the similarity, attraction, compromise, and phantom context effects. Our results show that this network approach provides a simple representation of complex choice behaviour, and can be used to gain a better understanding of how the many choice phenomena and key theoretical principles from different types of decision-making are connected.

Citing Articles

Context-effect bias in capuchin monkeys (Sapajus spp.): exploring decoy influences in a value-based food choice task.

Marini M, Boschetti C, Gastaldi S, Addessi E, Paglieri F Anim Cogn. 2022; 26(2):503-514.

PMID: 36125642 PMC: 9950244. DOI: 10.1007/s10071-022-01670-0.


A Maximum Entropy Model of Bounded Rational Decision-Making with Prior Beliefs and Market Feedback.

Patrick Evans B, Prokopenko M Entropy (Basel). 2021; 23(6).

PMID: 34073330 PMC: 8227139. DOI: 10.3390/e23060669.


In Your Face(t)-Personality Traits Interact With Prototypical Personality Faces in Economic Decision Making.

Weiss M, Paelecke M, Hewig J Front Psychol. 2021; 12:652506.

PMID: 33967914 PMC: 8097003. DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.652506.

References
1.
Edwards W . The theory of decision making. Psychol Bull. 1954; 51(4):380-417. DOI: 10.1037/h0053870. View

2.
Busemeyer J . Decision making under uncertainty: a comparison of simple scalability, fixed-sample, and sequential-sampling models. J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn. 1985; 11(3):538-64. DOI: 10.1037//0278-7393.11.3.538. View

3.
Bogacz R, Brown E, Moehlis J, Holmes P, Cohen J . The physics of optimal decision making: a formal analysis of models of performance in two-alternative forced-choice tasks. Psychol Rev. 2006; 113(4):700-65. DOI: 10.1037/0033-295X.113.4.700. View

4.
Ratcliff R, McKoon G . The diffusion decision model: theory and data for two-choice decision tasks. Neural Comput. 2007; 20(4):873-922. PMC: 2474742. DOI: 10.1162/neco.2008.12-06-420. View

5.
Roe R, Busemeyer J, Townsend J . Multialternative decision field theory: a dynamic connectionist model of decision making. Psychol Rev. 2001; 108(2):370-92. DOI: 10.1037/0033-295x.108.2.370. View