Role of Vaccine Efficacy in the Vaccination Behavior Under Myopic Update Rule on Complex Networks

How to effectively prevent the diffusion of infectious disease has become an intriguing topic in the field of public hygienics. To be noted that, for the non-periodic infectious diseases, many people hope to obtain the vaccine of epidemics in time to be inoculated, rather than at the end of the epidemic. However, the vaccine may fail as a result of invalid storage, transportation and usage, and then vaccinated individuals may become re-susceptible and be infected again during the outbreak. To this end, we build a new framework that considers the imperfect vaccination during the one cycle of infectious disease within the spatially structured and heterogeneous population. Meanwhile, we propose a new vaccination update rule: myopic update rule, which is only based on one focal player's own perception regarding the disease outbreak, and one susceptible individual makes a decision to adopt the vaccine just by comparing the perceived payoffs vaccination with the perceived ones of being infected. Extensive Monte-Carlo simulations are performed to demonstrate the imperfect vaccination behavior under the myopic update rule in the spatially structured and heterogeneous population. The results indicate that healthy individuals are often willing to inoculate the vaccine under the myopic update rule, which can stop the infectious disease from being spread, in particular, it is found that the vaccine efficacy influences the fraction of vaccinated individuals much more than the relative cost of vaccination on the regular lattice, Meanwhile, vaccine efficacy is more sensitive on the heterogeneous scale-free network. Current results are helpful to further analyze and model the choice of vaccination strategy during the disease outbreaks.