Conflict Aversion: Preference for Ambiguity Vs Conflict in Sources and Evidence

This research investigates preferences and judgments under ambiguous vs conflicting information. Three studies provided evidence for two major hypotheses: (1) Conflicting messages from two equally believable sources are dispreferred in general to two informatively equivalent, ambiguous, but agreeing messages from the same sources (i.e., conflict aversion); and (2) conflicting sources are perceived as less credible than ambiguous sources. Studies 2 and 3 yielded evidence for two framing effects. First, when the outcome was negative, subjects' preferences were nearly evenly split between conflict and ambiguity, whereas a positive outcome produced marked conflict aversion. Second, a high probability of a negative outcome or a low probability of a positive one induced conflict preference. However, no framing effects were found for source credibility judgments. Study 3 also investigated whether subject identification with a source might affect preferences or credibility judgments, but found no evi dence for such an effect. The findings suggest cognitive and moti vational explanations for conflict aversion as distinct from ambi guity aversion. The cognitive heuristic is that conflict raises suspicions about whether the sources are trustworthy or credi ble. The motivational explanation stems from that idea that if sources disagree, then the judge not only becomes uncertain but also must disagree with at least one of the sources, whereas if the sources agree then the judge may agree with them and only has to bear the uncertainty. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.