Health Insurance: the Tradeoff Between Risk Pooling and Moral Hazard

Overview

Journal J Health Econ

Specialty Health Services

Date 1996 Sep 4

PMID 10164045

Citations 24

Authors

W G Manning

M S Marquis

Affiliations

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Abstract

Choosing optimal health insurance coverage involves a trade-off between the gain from risk reduction and the deadweight loss from moral hazard. This paper examines this trade-off empirically by estimating both the demand for health insurance and the demand for health services. It relies on data from a randomized controlled trial of cost-sharing's effects on the use of health services and on the health status for a general, non-elderly population.

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